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What did say on pay 
actually say about 
CEO compensation? 
Say on Pay and 
Compensation Design
Will shareholder yes votes be 
as prevalent when stock prices 
aren’t rebounding? The “Financial 
Times” reported in July 2011 that 
of the first 2,300 meetings of the 
Russell 3000 index companies only 1.7 percent (39) had 
votes of less than 50 percent and an additional 8.2 percent 
(188) had less than than 70 percent of the vote. Is this 
a vote of confidence or the first exhibition of newfound 
protest powers? Really understanding the significance of 
these votes and what might happen next is not so easy. As 
one colleague put it, all we are certain of about say on pay 
is that its arrival has the new-baby effect — it’s demanding 
far more time and energy than expected, and its full impact 
on the world won’t be known for years.
One Impact of This Year’s Say on Pay: More Talk
The 2011 proxy season was the first time publicly traded 
firms in the United States were required by law to solicit 
from their shareholders advisory yes or no votes on the 
pay package awarded to the CEO. 
I’ve heard executives, board members, compensation prac-
titioners and shareholder activists all acknowledge devoting 
a lot of energy to preparing for these inaugural say on pay 
votes. Companies are increasingly engaging their owners — 
shareholders (mostly large institutional shareholders) — on 
the topic of CEO pay and pay practices in advance of share-
holder meetings where the votes take place. Companies’ 
proxy statements have evolved to be more transparent, 
and anecdotal evidence suggests that boards of directors 
made pre-vote modifications to compensation plans when 
pushback was particularly strong. But, did the heightened 
company-shareholder engagement or the transparency 
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got a
question
forced by the say on pay regulation have any systemic or 
large-scale impact on the level or mix of CEO pay?
Did Say on Pay Change the Way 
Boards Pay Executives?
Trying to determine if say on pay had a material effect 
on how companies pay executives is nearly impossible 
from one year’s data, but some observations are compel-
ling. In a forthcoming 2011 report I wrote with Judit Torok 
from The Conference Board, we analyze the 2009-2010 
change in CEO compensation for 2,047 firms publicly 
listed in the United States. In  this year-to-year matched 
set of companies, we found: 
 ❙ In every industry, the median CEO received a raise 
(positive year-on-year change) in total CEO 
compensation. For example, the median 2009-2010 
total CEO pay raise is 26.65 percent in industrial 
and transportation equipment, 28.64 percent in 
wholesale trade and 36.15 percent in holding 
companies. Construction had the smallest median 
change, 1.12 percent (positive nonetheless). 
 ❙ The mix of pay shifted some. For example, in the 
communications industry, the average share of total 
compensation paid in salary fell by 6.53 percentage 
points to just over one-quarter (26.12 percent) of total 
compensation. At the same time, the share in stock 
awards was up 7.35 percentage points to 28.68 percent. 
 ❙ On average, salary’s share of total compensation fell in 
all but two of the 22 industries, (with food and tobacco 
and non-banking financial services seeing less than a 
one-percentage-point gain in the average salary share). 
Stock-based pay, on the other hand, increased its average 
compensation share in 20 of the 22 industries (only food 
and tobacco and commodities saw modest declines).
That these changes occurred in the year that U.S. say on 
pay regulation came into effect is not substantive evidence, 
however, that the say on pay votes caused these changes. A 
year ago, prior to say on pay, Torok and I computed that the 
annual median change in total compensation was negative 
in 12 of 22 industries, with the year-on-year median CEO 
pay hits ranging from cuts of -1.17 percent in textiles and 
apparel to -23.38 percent in construction. If 2010’s CEO 
compensation outcomes are due to say on pay, then the new 
Dodd-Frank regulation caused 12 industries to reverse the 
pay cutting they inflicted on CEOs the previous year. Disen-
tangling the measureable effects of say on pay will take 
more time and robust statistical analysis. But rest assured, 
researchers are working on it.
What Will Happen to Say on Pay in the Future?
In spring 2011 — the time when many shareholders were 
casting their say on pay votes — many companies in the 
United States had seen considerable gains in stock prices. 
The S&P500, for example, rose more than 24 percent 
between the start of July 2010 through the start of July 
2011. What will happen in say on pay votes in a year when 
the stock market has not done so well?
Imagine a company with a given executive compensation 
system in place (e.g., salary at a certain level and frac-
tion of at-risk bonus, restricted stock, stock options, other 
compensation, etc. all known). Suppose stock prices rose 
(as we saw in spring 2011) and that the say on pay vote was 
a 90-percent pass. What if the company has the identical 
compensation system in place (all formulas unchanged) 
the following year but stock prices fall? How likely is it 
that the company will now experience, say, an 80-percent 
pass vote, or a 70-percent pass vote? If such a drop in say 
on pay affirmation occurs, how much of that percentage 
point drop in support do you suppose is due to the stock 
price and not to a change of mind about the quality of 
the pay system? 
In the coming months and years, researchers and practi-
tioners will need to answer many questions, not the lesser 
of which are: 
 ❙ What is a good vote of confidence on CEO pay? 
Does a vote pass at better than 50 percent in 
favor or should a substantially higher vote share 
(say, 80 percent or 90 percent or 95 percent) be 
necessary to demonstrate shareholder approval? 
 ❙ What should a company do after a negative vote, 
whether that be less than 50 percent or even less 
than 70 percent or 90 percent? Some critics of 
say on pay argue that firms have very little time 
to do anything about negative votes since by the 
time information is reported in a proxy the orga-
nization is already well into its next fiscal.
 ❙ Is the vote is really about pay or, perhaps, some 
other gripe shareholders have with management? 
Only time (and a lot of statistical work) will tell. 
